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Responsibility, January 8, 2011

NORA FREEMAN ENGSTROM*
My current project involves law firms I call settlement mills, which are
high volume, heavy advertising, personal injury law firms in the United
States. I’m going to begin by briefly describing what settlement mills are
and then consider how they might shed light on what we know about
attorney advertising and access to justice in the contingency fee context.
We have now had attorney advertising in the United States for some three
decades. In that time, at least in the personal injury context, there is some
evidence that attorney advertising has made legal services more readily
available to those of limited means—just as proponents of attorney
advertising hoped and predicted.
But attorney advertising, while
apparently narrowing one justice gap, has perhaps produced another. This
justice gap, I will suggest, is based not on claimants’ willingness to retain
counsel, or even claimants’ ability to afford counsel, but is rather based on
claimants’ ability to choose counsel wisely, and it manifests itself in the
kind of counsel one selects.
Thus far, my broader project studies twelve settlement mills from ten
different states. I’ve done extensive original research to build a composite
view of these firms by combing through files from attorney disciplinary
proceedings, reviewing records from attorney malpractice actions in state
and federal courts, and conducting fifty telephone interviews with past and
current settlement mill attorneys and non-attorney employees. To be sure,
twelve firms is not a huge number, but these twelve firms, in their heydays,
collectively accounted for the settlement of more than 15,000 claims
annually, which is, it seems, a fairly significant amount of attorney-client
interaction.1
*
Copyright 2011 by Nora Freeman Engstrom. Assistant Professor, Stanford Law
School. My thanks to Scott L. Cummings and Robert L. Rabin for helpful comments
on previous drafts.
1. Indeed, during its roughly fifteen-year existence, one of the firms I studied
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So, what are settlement mills? In a recent paper entitled Run-of-the-Mill
Justice, I walk through ten characteristics that define settlement mills and
help to distinguish these firms from other, more typical, personal injury
practices.2 Here, I’ll just emphasize four traits that are particularly salient.
First, and most relevant for our purposes, settlement mills are aggressive
advertisers. Attorney advertising is big business. But despite the seeming
ubiquity of attorney ads and the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on
attorney advertising annually, in terms of numbers, relatively few personal
injury lawyers advertise on television.3 Most don’t. Meanwhile, even
heavy advertisers still typically obtain the majority of their clients from
traditional sources, namely practitioner referrals and client word-of-mouth.4
In contrast, all of the settlement mills I have so far studied advertise; they
all advertise on television, and they all obtain the majority or vast majority
of clients from these advertising efforts.5
The second notable characteristic is that settlement mills have a high
volume of small claims. Personal injury lawyers are known for having

reportedly settled a whopping 30,000 claims. Penny Font, Disbarred, But Not
(May
18,
2009),
Disbranded,
BUSINESSREPORT.COM
http://www.businessreport.com/news/2009/may/18/disbarred-not-disbranded-lgl1/
(quoting E. Eric Guirard). Another firm founder is likewise on record saying that, in
his twenty-year practice, he represented “thousands and thousands” of accident victims.
Transcript of Record at 10, Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Weiss, No. 94-CI-18282
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Weiss Disciplinary Transcript] (testimony of
Joe W. Weiss). In comparison, only about 2,200 civil claims are resolved each year by
juries in all of the nation’s federal courts. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR JAMES C. DUFF, 2010 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
388,
tbl.T1,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness
/2010/appendices/T01Sep10.pdf.
2. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1485 (2009).
3. A recent study found that, even among those Texas lawyers with the highest
volume of relatively low-dollar claims, only 13% advertised on television. Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The
Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1789 n.19
(2002); see also AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT
THE CROSSROADS: PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 52 (1995) [hereinafter,
ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING] (reporting on a 1993 Gallup Poll commissioned by
the ABA Journal, which found that 61% of respondents indicated that their firms
advertised but that only 2% did so on television); Bar Defends Advertisement Rules,
FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 26, 1989 (quoting Florida Bar President Stephen N. Zack, who
indicated that fewer than fifty of Florida’s 35,000 attorneys advertised on television).
4. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 3, at 1789 (showing that, though most Texas
plaintiffs’ lawyers advertise, lawyer advertising is not any lawyer group’s predominant
client source); see also HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 4750, 55 (2004) (“Among the personal injury specialists who do advertise, an average of
21 percent of the clients come as a direct result of the advertising; only two of the
personal injury specialists reported obtaining half or more of their clients from
advertising.”).
5. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1492-93, 1521-24.
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high claim volumes, as compared to other lawyers in other specialties.6
And settlement mills’ case volumes are roughly triple the personal injury
average.7 While studies suggest that conventional personal injury attorneys
have around seventy open files at any one time and serve roughly 110
clients per year, the average settlement mill negotiator might juggle 250
claims at any one time and settle around 350 claims annually.8 Some
lawyers handle substantially more. For example, a lawyer from a Georgia
firm reported that she personally settled 600 or 700 claims in a mere
thirteen-month-span, which roughly translates into settling a claim every
four working hours.9 Most of these claims, meanwhile, are small,
principally soft-tissue injury claims (e.g., sprains, strains, contusions, and
whiplash) sustained in auto accidents.10 Thus, it is fair to think of
settlement mills as auto accident specialists.
Third, settlement mills tend to have an entrepreneurial, rather than a
professional, orientation. As one settlement mill partner put it: “I
always . . . approached this as a business first and a law firm second.”11 At
these firms, there is a lot of delegation to non-attorney employees, and
there is little emphasis on traditional “lawyering,” meaning there is very
little legal research, little factual investigation of claims, and little
substantive interaction with clients.12 In fact, at some firms, it’s not
unusual for lawyers and clients to never meet.13 The lawyers at such firms,
perhaps not surprisingly, tend to describe the work as being very routinized
6. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 435-36 tbl.B.1 (1982) (showing “Mean Number of Clients per
Year” for various specialties).
7. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1492.
8. Sara Parikh, How the Spider Catches the Fly: Referral Networks in the
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243, 247 (2006) (citing JOHN P.
HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005)
(unpublished data)) (reporting that Chicago plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyers surveyed
in 1995 served an average of 142 clients per year); Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its
Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the Plaintiff‘s Personal Injury Bar,
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, at 73 (2001) (reporting that low-end personal injury
practitioners in Chicago served an average of seventy-nine clients per year).
9. Sworn Statement of S.S. at 6 (Aug. 19, 1998).
10. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1499-1500.
11. Brett Barrouquere, Attorneys Hit Local Airwaves—Many Say Business Savvy
As Important As Legal Skills, ADVOC. (BATON ROUGE), Nov. 30, 2003 (quoting E. Eric
Guirard); see also Weiss Disciplinary Transcript, supra note 1, at 19 (testimony of Joe
W. Weiss) (“I do my best to conduct my business as best I can.”).
12. To be sure, it is not unusual for even conventional personal injury attorneys to
spend comparatively little time engaged in legal research, investigating claims, and
preparing pleadings. See KRITZER, supra note 4, at 99, 136. Nor is it unusual for
conventional attorneys to delegate tasks to underlings and keep a careful eye on the
bottom line. Id. at 112-13, 137. What sets settlement mills apart, though, is the
extreme emphasis on efficiency, the extent to which procedures are mechanized, and
the lopsided balance struck between the conceptualization of the practice of law as a
business, rather than a profession.
13. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1493-95, 1500-01.
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and mechanized, with some describing their work in the following manner:
• “I might as well have been working on an assembly line.”14
• “I felt like a claims adjuster with a law license.”15
• “Most of the cases I handled, I didn’t even know the facts of the
case.”16
• “[I]t’s a cookie-cutter. It’s routine. You call and they offer you
$500 and you ask for $2,000 a month, and then you go to
$1,000. If you get $1,200, you do it, but it’s just boom, boom,
boom like that.”17
• “We’ve got a Stop and Go’s here. Drive in, get you something
to drink, get out on the road. That’s the way they’re run. It is
not a conventional law firm. They do not want you to practice
conventional law.”18
Fourth, and related to the quotes above, at settlement mills, the focus is
on settlements. It is not on lawsuits. It is not on referrals. It is certainly
not on trials.19 This focus on settling is sometimes maintained by quotas or
contests, imposed on settlement negotiators, requiring that negotiators—
who may or may not be lawyers—settle a given number or dollar value of
claims within a particular time period or offering rewards or prizes to those
who do.20 One firm in Louisiana, for example, used a series of carrots and
sticks to spur settlements. At that firm, non-attorneys negotiated
settlements, and their compensation was tied to fees they generated. The
firm bestowed a monthly lion award on the highest fee generator (to reward
the “king of the jungle”) and gave a monthly “monkey” award to the lowest
fee generator, who was said to have a “monkey on their back.” And last
but not least, the firm sponsored group contests, whereby, if the negotiators
generated a particular amount in fees during a particular period, all in the
firm would be rewarded with group trips to exotic locales.21 Further
14. Telephone Interview with R.J. (Apr. 8, 2008).
15. Telephone Interview with K.R. (May 1, 2008).
16. Sworn Statement of S.S. at 41 (Aug. 19, 1998).
17. Transcript of Louisiana Disciplinary Bd. Hr’g, In re Lawrence D. Sledge, No.
00-DB-135 (Feb. 16, 2001), at 335 (testimony of Lawrence D. Sledge).
18. Telephone Interview with D.W. (May 8, 2008).
19. See Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1495-98, 1502-03 (describing the relative
paucity of lawsuits and trials); see also Telephone Interview with E.C. (Apr. 22, 2008)
(explaining that, at his law firm, his job was to “[s]ettle cases. Set ‘em up and settle
them”).
20. Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1501.
21. See Transcript of Louisiana Disciplinary Bd. Hr’g, In re E. Eric Guirard &
Thomas R. Pittenger, File No. 04-DB-005 (Sept. 23, 2004), at 216-28 (testimony of E.
Eric Guirard) (describing these incentives). Similar incentives were apparently used to
spur settlements at the Azar firm of Colorado. There, attorneys were reportedly
expected to generate $30,000 to $40,000 in fees per month. The highest fee generator
each month was, according to one source, recognized with a “shark” award. And
attorneys were compensated via straight commissions rather than salaries. See
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highlighting the focus on settlement, a few of the firms I’ve studied never,
as far as I can tell, tried a case to verdict despite settling, literally,
thousands of claims.22
Hopefully that brief overview helps to set the scene for what settlement
mills look like and clarifies at least some of the ways in which these firms
differ from conventional counsel. Obviously settlement mills raise a host
of important questions implicating legal ethics, tort law, bargaining
behavior, and so on. However, the issue I want to focus on here is what
settlement mills might be able to tell us about access to justice and attorney
advertising.
In the United States it is well known that we have two tiers of justice—
one for the haves and one for the have-nots. It is a dynamic that plays out
in various substantive areas of law, from criminal law, to family law, to
landlord tenant law, to bankruptcy law, and so on. The rich, it is said,
benefit from highly personalized legal services.23 The have-nots, on the
other hand, when lucky enough to be represented at all, are, and have long
been, represented by under-paid and over-burdened practitioners whose
adversarial impulses are muted by some mix of high caseloads, insufficient
support, and inadequate training.24
The one place that this class justice is often thought not to obtain—
where it is commonly said that there’s “equality of representation”—is in
the particular world of personal injury.25 That’s because we have the
Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1501.
22. See, e.g., Matter of Zang, 741 P.2d 267, 275 (Ariz. 1987) (describing the law
firm of Zang & Whitmer, where “no attorney . . . had tried a personal injury case to a
conclusion” and there was “a firm policy of not taking cases to trial”); Engstrom, supra
note 2, at 1509 (reporting that the Dupayne firm, during the late 1990s, “did not take a
single case to trial”); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011) (discussing the Weiss and Rogers law firms, which,
according to some accounts, did not conduct any jury trials during the period of study).
23. See EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK
50 (1986) (describing the work of a law firm lawyer for the affluent as “the work of a
fine custom tailor: highly individualized and with exquisite fit to a particular
situation”); see also BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS 4 (1970) (“Large efficient law firms have developed as a response to the
needs—and ability to pay—of the more affluent segments of society. And the large
firms seem to be serving these clients well.”).
24. Approximately 80% of low-income residents’ legal needs are wholly unmet.
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS A-1 (2009). For
descriptions of the disappointing services often available to the remaining 20%, see
MARJORIE GIRTH, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS 76-77 (1976); Jerome E. Carlin et al., Civil
Justice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 9, 55-58
(1966); Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12
UCLA L. REV. 381, 385 (1965).
25. PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS
OF TORT LAW 123 (1997) (“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers . . . function in the tort system to
provide injured persons with something that aggrieved citizens dealing with other areas
of law often lack: access to the courts and equality of representation.”) (emphasis
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contingency fee. It is very widely used.26 And the contingency fee is
thought to be the “great leveler” or, in H. Laurence Ross’s words: “[T]he
contingent fee . . . makes the little man’s claim as interesting to the lawyer
as the big man’s claim.”27
Yet, my study of settlement mills suggests that the picture might be
somewhat more complicated. Traditionally, some studies suggest that the
poor have been less likely than their wealthier counterparts to seek
compensation following an accidental injury.28 Poor individuals’ failure to
initiate claims, meanwhile, seems attributable not to a lack of financial
added); see also infra note 27. Of course, despite this lofty rhetoric, some inequity
invariably remains because lost wages are recoverable via the tort system, and
consequently, wealthy individuals will tend to suffer (and receive compensation for)
higher economic loss.
26. Approximately 96% of individual personal injury plaintiffs pay their lawyers
on a contingent-fee basis. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil
Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15 (1996).
27. H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 75 (1970); Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a
Law . . . What Might Happen If Contingent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 321, 341 (1998) (“Whatever else might be said about the contingent fee, it is a
great leveler.”); accord James W. Bollinger, Contingent Fees—The New Suggestion of
Judicial Supervision, 69 CENT. L.J. 355, 356 (1909) (“The contingent fee actually
makes the courthouse the one temple of justice for all, equally accessible to both the
rich and the poor.”); Lee S. Kreindler, The Contingent Fee: Whose Interests Are
Actually Being Served?, 14 FORUM 406, 406 (1979) (“The contingent fee makes it
possible for anyone in our society to get the best lawyer.”); Philip H. Corboy,
Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to the Courthouse Door, 2 LITIG. 27, 34
(1976) (stating that “the contingent fee’s advantage” is that it “equalizes otherwise
unequal litigants”). Notably, a number of states have commissioned comprehensive
legal needs studies in recent years, and a number of those studies don’t even inquire
about personal injury.
28. For example, in one 1957 study of auto accident claimants in New York City,
Robert Hunting and Gloria Neuwirth found that “[f]ollowing a minor car accident, over
one-quarter (27%) of those with low socio-economic status (‘SES’) took no action at
all, while practically no one (2%) with high SES failed to act.” ROBERT HUNTING &
GLORIA NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? A STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT CLAIMS 10, 98 (1962); accord ROBERT L. HOUCHENS, RAND, AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION VOL. III: PAYMENTS FROM ALL SOURCES 17 (1985)
(analyzing a survey of auto accident victims who sustained an injury between August
1975 and August 1977 and concluding that the likelihood of receiving some payment
“apparently increases with . . . family income”); see also ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL.,
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY
REPARATION 257 (1964) (finding that “seriously injured individuals who did not file a
suit tend to have lower incomes and are more likely to be in nonprofessional
occupations”); Helen R. Burstin et al., Do the Poor Sue More? A Case-Control Study
of Malpractice Claims and Socioeconomic Status, 270 JAMA 1697, 1699 (1993)
(finding that poor and uninsured patients were significantly less likely to file medical
malpractice claims, after controlling for injury severity). Not all studies reach this
conclusion, however. See, e.g., FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & FATEN SABRY, NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., THE PROPENSITY TO SUE: WHY DO PEOPLE SEEK LEGAL
ACTIONS 8 (2004) (analyzing RAND data from 1988-89 and concluding that income
“tend[s] not to have a robust effect on propensity to claim or sue”); AM. BAR ASS’N,
LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS, MAJOR FINDINGS FROM
THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 20 tbl.4-I (1994) (finding no meaningful
difference in the claiming rates of low and moderate-income individuals).
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need—which would, of course, cut in the opposite direction—but rather to
a lack of information concerning rights and potential remedies and also a
lack of knowledge about, and contact with, lawyers.29
Attorney advertising, which came about in 1977 with the Supreme
Court’s landmark opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, was supposed to
change that.30 In deciding Bates, the Court explicitly noted that the “the
middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately by
the legal profession,” and the Court expressed its faith that attorney ads
would dispel unfounded fears about lawyers and would help to expand
legal access to those of limited means.31 Others, too, predicted that
attorney advertising would spur additional claiming and attorney retention.
In the year following the Bates opinion, for example, one commentator
declared: “The advent of ‘attorney advertisements’ will add further to the
amount of automobile negligence litigation started by injured parties.
Newspaper ads mentioning auto accidents . . . will also raise a question in
the minds of the public, who now believe they have no right to sue in
tort.”32
Now, at a distance of some three decades, there is some evidence that the
Court’s hope—and the above prediction—have come to pass. In the
decades following the Bates decision, advertisements for legal services—
and particularly personal injury legal services, which now make up the bulk
of television attorney advertising—have proliferated.33 Indeed, attorney
29. Accord Bruce Campbell & Susette M. Talarico, Access to Legal Services:
Examining Common Assumptions, 66 JUDICATURE 313 (1982-83) (reporting on a
Georgia survey which found that low-SES individuals (experiencing a variety of legal
problems) were substantially less likely to hire lawyers or identify problems as
requiring legal assistance and speculating that these trends might be traceable, in part,
to poor individuals’ lack of knowledge about the availability of legal services); see
HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 28, at 99-100 (speculating that low-SES individuals
often fail to pursue a claim because of, inter alia, their “lack of understanding of what
their rights may be” and their “lack of contact with lawyers”).
30. 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 24, 34,
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (No. 76-316), 1976 WL 178669
(calling for the elimination of the ban on attorney advertising because, inter alia, “there
is not now sufficient information available to the public concerning legal services” and
“[t]he ban on advertising inhibits the assertion of legal rights by the segment of society
least familiar with its rights”).
31. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376-77 (declaring that the profession’s advertising ban
“likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor
and the unknowledgeable” and speculating that permitting advertising “might increase
the use of the judicial machinery”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also James
Sokolove, President, Trial Lawyers Marketing Association, Letter to the Editor, NAT’L
L.J., July 31, 1989, at 2 (“If we are truly to provide ‘justice for all,’ we must keep the
doors to our legal system open. And legal services advertising provides the key to that
door.”).
32. Lawrence C. Falzon, Comment, Michigan No-Fault: The Rise and Fall of
Socialized Negligence, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 99, 117 (1978).
33. For information on the growth of attorney advertising, see Richard J. Cebula,
Historical and Economic Perspectives on Lawyer Advertising and Lawyer Image, 15
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television outlays have grown exponentially, from $366,000 in 1977 to
roughly $428 million in 2002, in inflation-adjusted dollars.34
Simultaneously, studies suggest: (1) significantly more auto accident
victims are seeking compensation for injuries they sustain; and (2)
significantly more auto accident victims are retaining counsel to press their
claims.35 Indeed, Insurance Research Council consumer panel survey data
show more than a doubling of the proportion of represented auto accident
claimants between 1977 and 2002, from 19% to 43%.36
In sum, if the Supreme Court’s goal in Bates was to improve the public’s
knowledge about legal options and expand access to legal services, at least
in the personal injury automobile context, it appears the Court might well
have succeeded. Although other factors could surely explain the above
trends—including, for example, the substantial growth in the size of the
legal profession during this same period37—it’s certainly plausible that the
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 321 (1998). For the fact that the top spenders on legal
advertising are personal injury or plaintiff-related law firms, see ABA COMM’N ON
ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 130 (“Most television advertisements have been for
personal injury or other contingency-fee based services.”); Maria Aspan, Getting Law
Firms To Like Commercials, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C5 (reporting that “the top
10 spenders” on legal advertising “are all personal-injury or plaintiff-related law
firms”).
34. See Cebula, supra note 33, at 321 (providing advertising data from 1977
through 1992); KANTAR MEDIA, TREND REPORT FOR 2000-2004 (providing advertising
data for 2002) (on file with author). I converted the above advertising figures to 2011
dollars using an inflation calculator available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
35. For data on increased claiming, see INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO
INJURY CLAIMS, tbl.A-1 (2008) (showing that, between 1980 and 2006, the number of
paid bodily injury claims per 100 property damage claims rose dramatically, from 17.9
to 24.5); INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, FRAUD AND BUILDUP IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS:
PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE AUTO INSURANCE SYSTEM 25 (1996) (noting a “steady
increase[]” in bodily injury liability claim frequency from 1980 to 1993). The growth
in claims does not appear to be confined to the auto context. See Robert Rabin, Tort
Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4
n.11 (1988) (comparing medical malpractice claims data from 1956 and 1963 with data
from 1984 and 1985 and observing that “over the past two decades the incidence of
claims against medical practitioners has risen dramatically”). For data on increased
attorney retention, see INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAYING FOR AUTO INJURIES: A
CONSUMER PANEL SURVEY OF AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS 36 (2004) [hereinafter, IRC,
CONSUMER PANEL]; ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW
2d § 10:4 at 10-3 (2002) (“During the period from 1977 to 1987, according to surveys
involving almost 100,000 claims, there was a 42.5 percent increase in the number of
accident claimants who were represented by attorneys.”).
36. IRC, CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 35, at 36. Of course, this discussion tables
the difficult—and contested—normative question of whether increased claiming and
increased representation by counsel are positive or negative developments. There is
also some evidence that attorney advertising has increased attorney retention in other
areas too. See, e.g., Madeline Johnson, et al., Attorney Advertising and Changes in the
Demand for Wills, 22 J. OF ADVERTISING 35 (Mar. 1993) (analyzing time series data
from 1974 through 1989 tracking the ratio of estates probated without a will to estates
probated with a will and finding a drop in intestate deaths, starting in 1977, suggesting
(albeit not proving) that attorney advertising, which came about in 1977, increased the
demand for wills).
37. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 80-81 (2010)
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growth of attorney advertising has played a role.38 But now, we see a new
wrinkle when we shift focus from the identity of those who claim or fail to
claim to the identity of the lawyer one selects.
When I interviewed past and current settlement mill practitioners, I
usually asked them to describe their typical client. These responses are
fairly representative of the answers I received:
• “[T]hey were all poor; they were all uneducated.”39
• “Lower income.”40
• “Working class . . . . People who don’t have any particular
understanding of the legal system, except what they’ve heard
from television.”41
So, here is a puzzle. Settlement mills, to be sure, have certain clear
advantages; as I have discussed at length elsewhere, they actually have
much to recommend them.42 But they are, at bottom, a cut-rate legal
service provider. And, despite the existence of the contingency fee—the
“great leveler”—this cut-rate legal service (which, incidentally, costs no
less, on a percentage basis, than a traditional legal service) is
predominantly utilized by low-income clients.43
What explains this puzzle? There are, I think, a few possibilities. First,
as Barbara Curran reported after her 1977 national survey, when lowincome individuals pursue tort claims, they are perhaps more likely to seek
the assistance of counsel, presumably because of a sense, which may or
may not be well-founded, that they lack the literacy, sophistication, or
savvy to handle the problem effectively without legal assistance.44 If, as
(highlighting the near-quadrupling in the size of the legal profession from 1970 to
2009).
38. Accord MARJORIE M. BERTE, HIT ME—I NEED THE MONEY: THE POLITICS OF
AUTO INSURANCE REFORM 41 (1991) (attributing increased attorney involvement in
auto insurance claims to lawyer advertising); JOOST, supra note 35, at § 10:11, at 10-13
(same); see JOHN D. STUCKEMEYER, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., “EXTRAORDINARY HOW
POTENT CHEAP MUSIC IS”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING LAWYER ADVERTISING 2-7
(1993) (attributing increase in auto accident claiming to the increase in attorney
advertising).
39. Telephone Interview with C.P. (May 20, 2008).
40. Telephone Interview with T.H. (Apr. 15, 2008).
41. Telephone Interview with T.T. (July 14, 2008); see also Engstrom, supra note
2, at 1524 (describing typical settlement mill clients).
42. See generally Engstrom, supra note 22.
43. For more on settlement mill fees, see id. at 845-49.
44. BARBARA CURRAN ET AL., THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 152, 156-57 (1977) (“Problem-havers who consulted
lawyers on tort matters had substantially lower mean income ($8000) than those who
did not ($11,000).”); see also HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, supra note 28, at 98-99
(reporting that “[o]f those who decide to take action, persons with the lowest SES are
most likely to employ a lawyer”). But cf. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP, ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES, Vol. 1, 338 tbl.46S (1970)
(comparing attorney retention rates by “highest grade completed” and reporting that
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Curran suggests, the poor disproportionately want lawyers even for their
very small claims, and if, as noted previously, settlement mills occupy the
particular market niche willing to accept these very small claims, then that
will predictably affect settlement mills’ clientele.45 Second, as also noted
previously, settlement mills settle, and settle quickly, and the poor, often
lacking sturdy safety nets, might disproportionately prefer payment certain
and without delay. This, indeed, resonates with something Jerome Carlin
found in his now-classic studies of low-income clients, when he reported
that “poor clients often exert strong pressure to ‘settle out’ so that they can
pay their bills and have ‘something extra’ to live on.”46 Now, we come to
the third possibility for why settlement mills tend to represent low-income
individuals. It is the most provocative and returns us to our discussion of
attorney advertising. Specifically, the ABA’s 1994 Comprehensive Legal
Needs study found that the poor are far more likely to choose a lawyer on
the basis of attorney advertising as compared to their wealthier
counterparts.47
Why might the poor prefer advertising lawyers? Three explanations
again seem likely. First, as the ABA speculated, as opposed to their
wealthier counterparts, the poor know fewer lawyers and are less likely to
have used legal services in the past, meaning they are less likely to know
more personal ways to find lawyers and also less likely to know the
reputations of various practitioners.48 And this rings true, given what I have
seriously-injured auto accident claimants with college and graduate degrees were far
more likely to retain counsel, as compared to claimants with less formal education).
45. Not all lawyers accept simple soft-tissue injury cases. See Stephen Daniels &
Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225, 1256 tbl.8
(2004) (reporting on a survey of Texas plaintiffs’ lawyers which found that the
majority (59.2%) of respondents would not accept a hypothetical case involving “a
simple car wreck,” clear liability, adequate insurance, and “soft tissue injuries worth
$3000”); see also Steven Croley, Summary Jury Trials in Charleston County, South
Carolina, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2008) (“[T]ort plaintiffs with strong
liability claims but not exorbitant damages have little access to justice.”).
46. See Carlin et al., supra note 24, at 77. For the fact that settlement mills appear
to resolve claims with relative speed, see Engstrom, supra note 2, at 1502.
47. AM. BAR ASS’N, FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 28
(1994); ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 4 (“Nationally, more than one
in every five low income households who have used the services of a lawyer found that
lawyer through some form of advertising.”); accord Scott Sandlin, Poster Boy or
Scapegoat?, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 12, 1997, at A1 (quoting Will Hornsby of the
ABA’s Commission on Advertising: “If you look at who responds to advertising, they
are people who don’t otherwise know how to find a lawyer” and are generally “newlyrelocated, low-income, undereducated, and minorities”); TOM L. LEE, CONSUMER
ATTITUDES, RESPONSE PATTERNS AND MOTIVATION FACTORS 62, 65 (1985) (reporting
on a national survey that found low-income respondents were more likely to indicate
that they would identify a lawyer using advertising, as compared to middle-income or
high-income respondents).
48. See ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 97 (observing that lowincome individuals “are the least likely to know of other resources for finding a
lawyer,” and, compared to wealthier individuals, are less likely to know the reputations
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heard from settlement mill practitioners. As one firm founder publicly
explained: “There are no lawyers in my clients’ personal social circles.”49
Another former settlement mill lawyer similarly pointed out that her clients
“didn’t know what a real law firm was.”50
Second, there is an issue of targeting. Some attorney advertisers, the
ABA found and my interviews at least anecdotally confirm, specifically
target low-income groups.51 So, for example, one firm founder from
California called himself the “People’s Lawyer” and, in his advertisements,
tried “to appeal to folks who may not be upward-income individuals.”52
Another firm founder, from Louisiana, likewise said his ads targeted
“working class” individuals and those home during the day.53
Third and finally, there appears to be a belief shared by some lowincome individuals that attorney advertisers are actually superior to nonadvertisers. Here, a 1992 New Mexico study, specifically focused on
direct-mail advertisers, found that the poor and least educated were far
more likely to think attorney advertisers were of higher quality than nonadvertisers and inclined to give a better deal.54 The least educated were

of various practitioners); see also Kirk Johnson, State Bar Acts to Limit How Lawyers
June
21,
1992,
available
at
Advertise
Themselves,
N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/21/nyregion/state-bar-acts-to-limit-how-lawyersadvertise-themselves.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (quoting Professor Bruce Rogow
as stating: “People who respond to these ads don’t know other lawyers.”); TV
DAVIS
MEDIA,
Advertising
Advice
for
Attorneys,
GARY
http://televisionadvertising.com/lawyers.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (advising
prospective television advertisers to “Know Your Prospect” and specifying: “Your
prospect from TV advertising is not just someone who needs a lawyer. Your prospect
is someone who needs a lawyer and will hire one from TV. This usually means
someone who does not already have a lawyer and does not know any lawyers, someone
whose economic demo, in most cases, is working class or lower.”).
49. Mark Ballard, The Ad-Made Man and the Old-Line Firm: Changes in Law
Practice Are Played Out in Baton Rouge, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A1 (quoting E.
Eric Guirard).
50. Telephone Interview with S.S. (May 30, 2007).
51. ABA COMM’N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 3, at 97 (“Those who advertise
personal legal services, especially personal injury or other contingency-fee services,
target low and moderate-income populations.”); cf. Carl Hiaasen, Ad Man Tells
Lawyers: Cash in on TV, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 1989, at 1B (quoting Paul Landauer,
who, by his count, has produced more than 7,000 commercials for lawyers in 127
cities, as stating of his client-audience: “I want ‘em young, stupid and aggressive.”).
52. Deposition of James M. Rogers at 18-19, Wilson v. Law Offices of James M.
Rogers, No. 823761-7 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2000).
53. Barrouquere, supra note 11 (quoting E. Eric Guirard); see also Telephone
Interview with K.N. (Nov. 8, 2007) (reporting that ads at a South Carolina firm were
targeted to the “lowest common denominator”); Telephone Interview with L.T. (Mar.
6, 2008) (reporting that, at the same South Carolina firm, ads were “geared to the lower
socio-economic class”).
54. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at apps. 51, 52, Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of
the Sup. Ct. for N.M., 521 U.S. 1121 (1997) (No. 96-1780) (appending a December
1992 survey of Albuquerque adults’ responses to direct mail advertisements that was
commissioned by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of New Mexico).
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also twice as likely as their most educated counterparts to incorrectly
believe that advertising lawyers are legally required to be “experienced in
the trial” of cases in the substantive area in which they advertise, with a full
77% of the least educated respondents sharing that view.55 Or, as one
former settlement mill client said: “I figured . . . they wouldn’t let him on
TV that much if—you know, if he hadn’t been a good lawyer.”56
What settlement mills appear to highlight, then, is in some ways a
replication of the traditional justice gap but in the unlikely contingency fee
context. It is playing out not in whether a client gets a lawyer or not, but—
particularly for the small subset of settlement mill clients with serious
injuries—in the kind of legal services selected. And it is traceable, quite
crucially, not to inequities in clients’ ability to afford counsel, because the
contingency fee takes care of that, but rather, to clients’ ability to choose
counsel wisely and the unequal resonance of attorney advertising. This
fact, I contend, has profound implications for the Bar’s duty to make
objective information about lawyer quality more readily available.

55. See id. This finding comports with the result of a 1990 survey of Nevada
residents, commissioned by the Nevada Lawyers’ Advertising Study Committee. That
survey found that, of those who have not completed high school, 67% of respondents
incorrectly believed “that lawyers who advertise for certain types of cases necessarily
have specialized knowledge, training and skills in handling those types of cases.” John
DeWitt, Report of Findings: Nevada Lawyers’ Advertising Survey, 55 INTER ALIA 11,
16 (1990). But cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free
Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 730-33
(1997) (raising doubts about bar-commissioned studies). Also supportive is a recent
survey of 1554 individuals, which found that individuals who have less education,
lower income, and who are non-Caucasian are significantly more likely to respond
favorably to the question: “Would you be more likely or less likely to use a lawyer that
advertises or would it not make any difference to you?” That study found, quite
strikingly, that “[f]or each additional academic degree a potential client receives, his or
her probability of hiring an attorney who advertises decreases by 23%,” and
“[c]hanging a potential client’s racial category from non-Caucasian to Caucasian would
decrease the likelihood he or she would hire an attorney who advertises by 32%.”
Michael G. Parkinson & Sabrina Neeley, Attorney Advertising: Does It Meet Its
Objective?, 24 SERVS. MARKETING Q. 17, 25-26 (2003).
56. Transcript of Record at 866-67, May v. Bloomfield, No. D029136 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993), at 3324 (testimony of Jerry May).
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